It’s reasonable for a tenant to expect privacy with respect to the inside of their apartment, but it’s also reasonable for a landlord to sometimes want to be able to document the condition of the inside of the unit. Taking photos of the inside of the unit will be the most effective way to do so.
The Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 (RTA) permits a landlord to enter a unit on notice to conduct an inspection. The landlord may want to document the results of the inspection, particularly if the tenant claims that the unit is in need of repair. This was the situation in Nickoladze v. Bloor Street Investments/Advent Property Management (note: I represented the landlord). The tenant had brought a previous application before the Landlord and Tenant Board claiming that the apartment needed to be repaired, and the landlord entered the unit on notice to inspect the areas in question. The landlord took photos of those areas for use at the hearing of the tenant’s application. That application ultimately settled, but the tenant then brought a second application claiming that the landlord had breached the tenant’s privacy rights by taking the photos without the tenant’s consent. The tenant’s application was dismissed by the Board, and the tenant appealed to the Divisional Court.
There, the Court ruled that the taking of the photographs was not, in and of itself, unlawful. The unit was entered for a lawful purpose, and the photos were taken in direct response to the tenant’s complaints about the state of repair of the unit. Although it would have been “prudent” for the landlord to expressly state that photos would be taken during the inspection, there was no evidence that the photos would be used outside the hearing. The landlord didn’t breach the tenant’s rights. As such, the Divisional Court dismissed the tenant’s appeal.
But this decision doesn’t mean that your landlord has a blanket right to take photos of the inside of your apartment. For example, it may not be allowed if the photos were posted online because that could breach the tenant’s privacy. This issue could arise if the photos were being taken to market the unit for sale. Under the RTA, a landlord (or the landlord’s representative) is permitted to access the unit to take measurements or prepare diagrams of the layout of the unit to assist with the sale. However, the RTA does not permit a landlord to photograph the unit, or to post photos online.
In Juhasz v. Hymas, the issue was whether the tenant had wrongfully interfered with the landlord’s right to market the unit for sale by refusing to allow photos. The tenant was willing to allow the landlord’s representative to take measurements of the inside of the unit, but objected to her family’s personal possessions being photographed and published online. The landlord successfully argued before the Board that the tenant had interfered with his right to market the unit for sale, but the Divisional Court overturned it on the basis that the RTA did not expressly permit the taking of photos as part of marketing a unit for sale. The Court concluded that requiring a tenant to allow her apartment and personal possessions to be photographed would be a breach of the tenant’s right to privacy.
Given these decisions from the Court, some relevant considerations include:
A recent decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board (the “Board”) has drawn some interest in the social housing community. By way of some context, some time ago, a supportive housing provider (the “SHP”) entered into a lease with an owner of an apartment building (the “Private Sector Landlord”) to rent a rental unit. The purpose of the lease, from the SHP’s perspective, was to sublet the rental unit to a tenant who participated in the SHP’s programs. This is a fairly common arrangement for social housing providers. For reasons that I do not know, and that do not matter for the purposes of this discussion, the Private Sector Landlord applied to the Board for an order to terminate the SHP’s tenancy because it, or someone it permitted in the residential complex, substantially interfered with, among other things, the reasonable enjoyment of the Private Sector Landlord.
An owner of a unit in a commercial condominium corporation failed to pay his common expenses for over six years. Despite this, no certificate of lien was ever registered. In an effort to collect what had then become a very substantial amount of arrears, the condominium corporation brought an application for a compliance order under s. 134(5) of the Condominium Act asking that the owner pay all arrears of common expenses.
The court declared that the owner was in breach of its obligation to contribute to the common expenses as set out in s. 84 of the Act. The court then ordered that the owner comply with its duties and obligations under the Act. In doing so, the owner was obligated to pay almost $25,000 in damages as a result of the noncompliance, the corporation’s costs of almost $14,000 incurred in obtaining the order. In addition, the total of the damages and costs awarded were ordered to be added to the common
expenses for the unit.
This was an appeal by an insurance company of an order obtained by the condominium corporation, which order had entitled the corporation to a substantial payout under its insurance policy. The corporation had a fire protection system, which was used to direct water through the sprinkler and fire hose systems in the building, and which had been improperly designed and/or installed. As a result of this improper design and/or installation, one of the standpipes that made up part of the system failed, causing a flood that resulted in an estimated $20 million in damage to the building. The corporation subsequently replaced the fire protection system at a cost of approximately $600,000.
On June 30, 2008 , with the enactment of Bill 107 , the Human Rights Code Amendment Act, the Ontario government effected changes t o O n t a r i o ’s Human Rights Code. The result of these changes was a significant revamp in the way in which human rights are protected and enforced, and how human rights complaints are received and processed. For condominium corporations, these changes are important, as they require condominium owners, directors and managers to adapt to a new way of handling human rights issues.
As many of you are aware, my practice involves both condominium law and insurance law. These two practice areas often intersect, sometimes with interesting results. In that regard, our firm was recently involved in a personal injury matter involving an elderly condominium unit owner who was attacked on the common elements by an unleashed dog. She suffered serious injuries as a result, and we brought an action on her behalf against the dog owners and the condominium corporation.
As many of you are aware, we are regularly asked to prepare case law updates for the magazine. In the course of preparing these updates, we review dozens of condominium cases. However, even if we did not prepare these updates, we would still review these cases, not just because the facts of these cases are often interesting but also because it is important for us as condominium lawyers to be up-to-date on the latest developments in the law so that we can properly advise our condominium corporation clients.
A responsible condominium community reasonably ought to have, and some would say must have, a condominium corporation that behaves responsibly in carrying out its duties. So, what are the duties of a condominium corporation? Depending on one’s mood, one might be tempted to say “to alternatively aggravate and frustrate everyone who comes into contact with it.” However, a more technically accurate (if less satisfying) answer would be “to manage the property and the assets, if any, of the corporation on behalf of the owners.” This is set out in section 17 of the Condominium Act, 1998 .
This was a motion by the plaintiff Royal Bank of Canada for summary judgment against the defendants, Mr. and Ms. Khan. The Khans owned a condominium unit, and had ceased paying their common expenses due to dissatisfaction with repair work carried out by the corporation. As a result, the condominium corporation had registered a lien on the title to the unit. Since a condominium lien, when registered, has priority over most other encumbrances on a unit (including mortgages), a mortgagee will often pay the arrears in order to discharge the lien. In this case, the bank, which held a mortgage on the unit, chose to do so.
As most people reading this are likely aware, ACMO has three classes of membership: Professional (property managers), Corporate (property management companies), and Associate (other professionals in the condominium industry). ACMO Associate Members include contractors, service providers, suppliers and many others who do business with condominium corporations.
It is hardly news to a board of directors or a condominium manager that condominium corporations require contributions from owners, in the way of common expenses, to be able to function. Common expenses are, in the words of Justice Lane in York Condominium Corporation #482 v. Christiansen, “the life blood of the [condominium] corporation.”
This was the latest, to the date of the decision, in a long series of reported decisions relating to this condominium corporation. The corporation, which was comprised of 897 residential units, had been governed by a court-appointed administrator since 2006 . In a referendum ordered by the court in December 2011 , an “overwhelming majority” of the unit owners voted that the court-appointed administration should end and the governance of the corporation should transition to an elected board of directors.
This was an appeal by a couple who owned a condominium unit from an order obtained on an application by the condominium corporation, as previously reported in this space in the winter 2009 edition of CM Magazine. The corporation’s declaration contained a provision that each unit was only to be used as a “one family residence”, and defined “family” as “a social unit consisting of parents and their children, whether natural or adopted, and includ[ing] other relatives if living with the primary group”. The respondent unit owners had been operating their unit as a rooming house, which, the condominium corporation alleged, was a breach of the declaration. The judge hearing the application agreed, holding that the respondents had breached the declaration, and ordering them to comply with same.
This was a complaint brought before the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal by Mr. Harton, who was the owner of a strata unit in the respondent strata corporation, based on what he alleged to be discrimination against him by the respondent as a result of his physical disability.
Mr. Harton’s unit in Vancouver faced west and overlooked the water. As a result of this, Mr. Harton alleged that his unit was subjected to high levels of direct and reflected radiation. He further alleged that he was at an unusual risk of developing skin cancer, and that he had been previously treated to have skin cancer removed. According to Mr. Harton, his doctor had advised him to minimize his exposure to the sun.
The applicant, Ms . McMillan, owned a condominium unit in a 32 -unit condominium corporation. The applicant’s unit, like the other units, was a freestanding one-storey house sitting on an individual parcel of land. The house itself was considered the unit, and the area extending from the front and rear entrances to the boundaries of the parcel of land was the exclusive use common element appurtenant to the unit. At each entrance was a wooden landing with two wooden steps extending from each respective landing to the ground. The landings had railings around them, but the steps did not.
This was the consolidated Small Claims Court trial of five separate actions. All five actions were brought by Mr. Swan, a former director of a condominium corporation, for defamation and libel. The five actions were brought against the condominium corporation, two directors of the condominium corporation (one of whom, Ms. Goan, the plaintiff sued twice), and the corporation’s property manager.
This motion by the condominium corporation, and the action within which the motion was brought, arose as a result of a lien registered against the defendant’s unit by the corporation. The lien was registered pursuant to the Condominium Act, 1998 as a result of repeated failures by the defendant, Mr. Jaworowski, to pay his common expenses.
This motion by the condominium corporation, and the action within which the motion was brought, arose as a result of a lien registered against the defendant’s unit by the corporation. The lien was registered pursuant to the Condominium Act, 1998 as a result of repeated failures by the defendant, Mr. Jaworowski, to pay his common expenses. Pursuant to the Act, the lien covered the arrears of common expenses, as well as interest on the unpaid common expenses and the legal fees incurred by the corporation in connection with the attempted collection of the common expenses.
After the lien was registered, Mr. Jaworowski brought an action in Small Claims Court claiming the “wrongful collection of condo fees and the reimbursement of legal fees, extra costs incurred and to establish the true balance of common element fees. At the trial of that action, Mr. Jaworowski acknowledged that he had been in arrears at the time that the lien was registered, and that the lien was therefore valid. Accordingly, the Small Claims Court dismissed Mr. Jaworowski’s claim and awarded relatively nominal costs of $500 to the condominium corporation.
As the amount secured by the lien remained unpaid, the corporation then brought a claim for possession of the unit so that same could be sold to recover this amount, and brought this motion for summary judgment on its
claim. Prior to the hearing of the motion, the defendant paid the common expense arrears and the nominal costs award made by the Small Claims Court, but did not make any payment in respect of interest on the arrears.
The court ordered Mr. Jaworowski to pay the interest.
More significantly, the court held that the corporation was obligated to defend Mr. Jaworowski’s claim that arose out of the lien process, and that the costs that the corporation incurred in the course of defending Mr.
Jaworowski’s claim were costs incurred as part of the lien collection process. As section 85 of the Act permits the recovery of the reasonable legal costs incurred in the course of collecting unpaid common expenses, the court ordered the corporation’s reasonable costs of defending
Mr. Jaworowski’s claim – over and above the costs award made by the Small Claims Court – to be added to the lien.
Author’s Note: although the court ultimately held that the corporation’s “reasonable costs” incurred in defending Mr. Jaworowski’s Small Claims Court action were somewhat less than the amount that the corporation had claimed in respect of such costs, a significant portion of such costs were added to the lien. This decision will certainly come as good news for
condominium corporations, which are often confronted with a decision as to whether they should engage in litigation with unit owners who have been properly liened and who are suing as a result of the lien, or whether they should negotiate a settlement with such owners in an effort to minimize costs.
The Appellant, Tenant, has not appeared. A friend of hers, Mr. Sherlock, has handed the court a note, dated August 24, 2016 from the North York General Hospital that reads: “Ms. Williams is currently at North York General Hospital for medical reasons. She will be unable to attend work for the next few days”.
This is an Application filed on November 28, 2013, alleging discrimination with respect to housing and services because of race, colour, place of origin, citizenship, disability, family status, marital status, age and association with a person identified by a protected ground contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).
For the second time in six months, the Plaintiff seeks to set aside a stay of proceedings in this action. On May 1, 2014, Corbett J. issued an order staying the proceedings and ordered the Plaintiff to police defendants $500 in costs. His endorsement reads, in its operative part. It appears (although it is not certain) that this action is simply a repetition of the claims in the small claims court action. However, I decline to exercise my discretion to dismiss this proceeding outright, without the benefit of argument and a detailed analysis of the claims in this proceeding and the small claims court proceeding. Rather, I order this proceeding stayed until
Mr. Nicoladze, the tenant, appeals from two orders of the Landlord and Tenant Board. The first order dismissed the tenant’s complaint that the respondent landlord had illegally entered his rental unit and, once there, had invaded his privacy by taking pictures of the interior of the unit. The second order dismissed the tenant’s request for a review of the first order.
Matthew Riddell (the “Appellant”) appeals from the final order of the Landlord and Tenant Board (the “Board”) dated April 16, 2014 terminating the Appellant’s tenancy effective April 30, 2014 on the basis he had substantially interfered with the reasonable enjoyment or lawful right, privilege or interest of the landlord, Dale Eldridge (the “Respondent”).
For the reasons that follow, I dismiss the appeal. In my view, the Board did not err in granting the Respondent’s application to terminate the Appellant’s tenancy. The Board’s findings that the Respondent had suffered and was continuing to suffer a severe allergic reaction caused or contributed to by the Appellant’s dog was more than supported by the evidence and sufficient to support a termination pursuant to s. 76(1)(b) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17 (the “Act”).
On the evening of August 1, 2011, the plaintiff Anne McGillivary went for a walk with her son, Charles McGillivary. Ms. McGillivary lived on Pendrith Street in the City of Toronto, near Christie Pits Park. They walked along Bloor Street West almost to Bathurst Street at which point they turned around and headed back toward home along the south side of Bloor Street West.
This is a motion to vary or set aside the order of Pattillo J., dated June 21, 2016, dismissing the Tenant’s appeal as devoid of merit and vacating the stay of the eviction order. At the conclusion of the motion, we dismissed the motion with reasons to follow. These are our reasons.
The test to be applied on such as a motion is set out in Marsden v. Ontario (Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2012 ONSC 6118 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — a panel should only intervene to vary or set aside the order of a single judge if the single judge made an error of law or a palpable and overriding error of fact.
The Landlord, Donna Latimer, brings this motion to dismiss the Tenant, James Regan’s appeal from the decision of the Landlord & Tenant Board (the “Board”) dated April 15, 2016, which, among other things, terminated his tenancy.
At the conclusion of the hearing, I advised the parties that, for reasons to follow, I was allowing the motion and ordering, among other things, that Mr. Regan’s appeal be quashed on the basis that it was completely devoid of merit and the stay be vacated.
The Landlords Sheldon Solomon and Sherry Solomon seek an order quashing the appeal of the Tenants Gad Levy and Karen Levy and lifting the stay of the order that was issued by Vincent Ching, a Member of the Landlord and Tenant Board (”the Board”) on January 15, 2015 (”the termination order”).
The Plaintiff, Sali Elbaum, is a unit owner of the Defendant, York Condominium Corporation No. 67. In 2012, while she was walking on the common elements of the condominium, she was seriously injured when an unleashed dog, owned by the Defendants Nathalia Gauto and Miqueias de Oliveira Silva, other residents of the condominium, allegedly attacked her causing her to fall.
This is a motion by the Plaintiff for summary judgement in accordance with the Statement of Claim. The Plaintiff claims a liquidated debt plus accruing factoring fees of 0.1 per cent per day. The original amount outstanding was $58,057.20. At the time the claim was issued in 2014, the amount of damages claimed, with accrued fees, was $219,070.92. As at September 15, 2015, the outstanding amount claimed was $253,549.08.
In condominium living, the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few. However, the power of the collective is not absolute. Power must be exercised within the bounds of the condominium’s established jurisdiction and with due respect to the legal rights and reasonable expectations of the few or the one.
As with most efforts to balance competing rights, the fact that people are involved complicates matters. It is well understood that in complicated moments people sometimes see exactly what they wish to see. Moreover, some find other’s illogic and foolish emotions an irritant.
The plaintiff having noted the defendant in default moves under Rule 19.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Rules”) for judgment. The primary relief sought by the plaintiff before this court was an injunction “restraining the defendant from engaging in or being employed by another employer engaged in a medical spa or weight loss centre business within a twenty mile radius of any medical spa or weight loss centre owned and operated by the plaintiff, for two years commencing October 12, 2012, terminating on October 11, 2014.” (my emphasis) Further injunctive relief was also sought in relation to allegations that the defendant had breached her employment contract with the plaintiff by entering into a contract of employment with Renew Medical Spa (“Renew”) at a location within nine miles of where the defendant had worked with the plaintiff.
The Plaintiff is a Condominium Corporation and the Defendant was the Property Management Inc. for the said Condominium Corporation and Ms. Layne was the Property Manager for the Condominium Corporation and Defendant. The defendants were terminated by the Plaintiff on September 2, 2011. The Defendant, Ms. Layne is the owner of the Corporate Defendant (KSM). The Plaintiff has made numerous requests to the Defendants to turn over to the Plaintiff the records and documents rightfully belonging to the Corporate Plaintiff. The Defendants have refused. The Question is: Do the Defendants have any lawful right to withhold the Property of the Plaintiff? The short answer is “No”. The Management Agreement between the parties specifically provides that the Condo’s property will be returned to the Condo Corp. upon termination of the Property Management Corp. Having heard argument from both sides, an order shall go pursuant to paragraph 1 (a) + (b) of the Notice of Motion of the Plaintiff dated September 28, 2011.
This is an Application filed on July 24, 2012, under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to accommodation because of creed and alleging reprisal or threat of reprisal.
Following a review of the Application, a Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) was issued on October 11, 2012, directing that a Summary Hearing take place. The CAD directed that the applicant would proceed first and that she would be required to make argument about why the Application should not be dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success, and point to the evidence on which she would establish a link between the respondent’s alleged actions and the grounds alleged, and intention to commit a reprisal.
This is an application to extend the term of Mr. Andrew Wallace, an Administrator of YCC 446, and to approve of his report for his activities for the period from November 1, 2011 to May 31, 2012, and for related matters.
Mr. Wallace was appointed the Administrator of YCC 446 by order of the court dated June 7, 2011. His term has been extended periodically by order of the court dated July 14, September 23 and November 29, 2011. The appointment is pursuant to s. 131 of the Condominium Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 19.
My recent experience sitting as a single judge of this Court to hear motions has convinced me that there is a growing practice by unscrupulous residential tenants to manipulate the law improperly, and often dishonestly, to enable them to remain in their rented premises for long periods of time without having to pay rent to their landlords. It is practice that imposes an unfair hardship on landlords and reflects badly on the civil justice system in Ontario. It calls for the Government, the Landlord and Tenant Board and this Court to respond.
The appellants sued the Toronto Community Housing Corporation and the Toronto Police Services Board in negligence for damages of $500,000. They claimed that the superintendent of their housing complex failed to control a number of residents for allegedly harassing them over an extended period of time.
The motion judge struck the claim on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. We see no error.
The appellant, Mr. Gledhill, is a former tenant of a rental unit municipally described as unit 702, 540 Sherbourne St, Toronto. Mr. Gledhill was arrested by the police on October 7, 2010. He was then released on bail on a recognizance which required him to stay away from 540 Sherbourne St. The criminal proceedings were eventually stayed.
On December 13, 2010 the Landlord and Tenant Board made an order terminating Mr. Gledhill’s tenancy at 540 Sherbourne St. The presiding Member was aware of the fact that Mr. Gledhill could not enter the premises at 540 Sherbourne St due to the terms of his recognizance of bail. This order was never appealed.
The tenant seeks leave for late filing of a notice of appeal of the order made on February 21, 2006 which is a decision made on the request to review the order of February 13, 2006.
He maintains that he has intended to appeal both orders and did not appeal in a timely manner because he was advised that he should not do so until all matters before the Tribunal are completed.
This is as flagrant an abuse of the court process as I have encountered. The appellant has occupied the premises since Nov. 11, 2010 without making a single rental payment. The Board terminated his tenancy and ordered him to vacate by July 17, 2011. He did not do so. On Aug. 8, 2011 he requested a review. The hearing was scheduled for Oct. 21, 2011. Friginette appeared with counsel, a settlement was negotiated and ON CONSENT the request for review was denied and the eviction order was confirmed. It is that consent order that Friginette has appealed.
On consent, order to go quashing the appeal.
In view of the history of this and prior proceedings, the landlord will have its costs fixed at $ 3,000. payable by the tenant within 30 days.
In this application I released reasons for decision on November 23, 2012. I have now received submissions on costs from both Mr. Schneiderman and from Horklick Levitt Di Lella LLP who were the solicitors of the Respondent on the application.
Mr. Schneiderman points out to a number of factors which he submits should reduce the amount being asked by the Respondents to an aggregate of $2,610.87. He does so pointing out that there was waiting time in court and that the Respondent’s counsel spent 2.6 hours between November 23 and 30, 2012 preparing costs submissions.
The applicant seeks a determination of rights under the Residential Tenancies Act, S.O. 2006, c. 17 (“the RTA”). The issues raised in this Application raise the following questions:
This is an appeal from an order of the Divisional Court that affirmed the decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board allowing the tenant’s landlord to evict him on the ground the landlord required the premises for his own residential occupation.
The main issue in this appeal is whether s. 48 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17, permits a sole shareholder of a corporation as “landlord” to evict a tenant of a residential unit owned by that corporation, if the shareholder requires possession for personal occupancy.
Mr. Whittaker has not appeared, although he was duly served, as appears from the affidavit of Natasha Baksh, sworn April 7, 2011, which indicates that the Motion Record, Factum + Brief of Authorities were sent to Mr. Whittaker by letter mail on that date at his last known address. Mr. Levitt has provided a letter dated April 20, 2011, from Mr. Whittaker, indicating that he has received the motion material, although he disputes the timeline of service. He has not appeared today, however, to raise the issue.
The appellant has appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board to the Divisional Court. In this motion, she seeks, among other things, an order staying her appeal pending the completion of a related action in the Superior Court of Ontario. In return, the respondent seeks an order dismissing the appeal for delay.
In brief, the appellant submits that she is not a tenant, but rather has been defrauded of her home by the respondent and others. She alleges that she and her mother were defrauded of the home in the process of re-mortgaging the property. The mortgage broker was the brother of the respondent’s boyfriend.
For reasons given, appeal dismissed. Costs fixed at $ 2518.95 payable to plaintiff Condominium Corp.
The appellant Carson appeals the judgment of Thomson J. of Small Claims Court dated March 22, 2007 pertaining to the claim of the Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation No. 1543 (“TSCC”) against Carson, a resident/unit owner of TSCC, and his claim against Myriad Property Management (“Myriad”).
Mr. Baig informs the court that he has removed the satellite dishes and removed any impact of their installation and removal. The parties have therefore agreed on a form of final Order. The only point of contention concerns costs.
The condominium rules and declaration make clear that the costs incurred by the condominium corporation can be recovered against an owner where it goes to court to enforce its rules against a condominium owner.
Mr. Whittaker has not appeared, although he was duly served, as appears from the affidavit of Natasha Baksh, sworn April 7, 2011, which indicates that the Motion Record, Factum + Brief of Authorities were sent to Mr. Whittaker by letter mail on that date at his last known address. Mr. Levitt has provided a letter dated April 20, 2011, from Mr. Whittaker, indicating that he has received the motion material, although he disputes the timeline of service. He has not appeared today, however, to raise the issue. The motion material was also served on the Landlord and Tenant Board, as appears from Ms. Baksh’s Affidavit of Service sworn April 8, 2011.
I am advised by Mr. Levitt that in the service of the Motion Record, the Property Manager and Superintendant knocked on the doors of all 317 units, provided to those who answered the letter contained in the Affidavits of Service filed and posted the letter on the doors of those who did not, inviting all unit owners who might be interested to attend at the management office for further information. 10 attended, 9 requested a copy of the material and all of those who requested the material were given a copy. I am satisfied with the method of service and validate it.
This is an application by York Condominium Corporation No. 26 (“YCC 26”) for an order under section 134 of the Condominium Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 19, requiring the respondent, Daniela Ramadani, to permanently remove her dog, a Yorkshire terrier, from her condominium unit and from the YCC 26 premises. YCC 26 also asks that certain cleaning and legal costs be charged to the respondent’s common expense account. Alternatively, YCC 26 asks for an order that an arbitrator be appointed, so that the dispute resolution process prescribed by section 132 of the Condominium Act can proceed.
This is an application that was brought before the courts today for a disposition of the Application in Support of this Application. The Applicants filed an Application Record, factum and Book of Authorities.
Counsel for the Respondent appeared today and sought an adjournment of the proceeding. He also sought to file an affidavit sworn by his client and served on the Applicant yesterday.